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On the conflict between logic and belief
in syllogistic reasoning
J. St. B. T. EVANS, JULIE L. BARSTON, and PAUL POLLARD
Plymouth Polytechnic, Plymouth PL4 8AA, England
Three experiments are reported that investigate the weighting attached to logic and belief
in syllogistic reasoning. Substantial belief biases were observed despite controls for possible
conversions of the premises. Equally substantial effects of logic were observed despite con-
trols for two possible response biases. A consistent interaction between belief and logic was
also recorded; belief bias was more marked on invalid than on valid syllogisms. In all experi-
ments, verbal protocols were recorded and analyzed. These protocols are interpreted in some
cases as providing rationalizations for prejudiced decisions and, in other cases, as reflecting
a genuine process of premise to conclusion reasoning. In the latter cases, belief bias was min-
imal but still present. Similarly, even subjects who focus primarily on the conclusion are influ-
enced to an extent by the logic. Thus a conflict between logic and belief is observed through-
out, but at several levels of extent.
An important debate in cognitive psychology sur-
rounds the notion of rationality with respect to human
inference (see Cohen, 1981, and associated commen-
taries). Recent reviews by Evans (1982) and Nisbett and
Ross (1980) have stressed the role of apparently irra-
tional processes in the study of inductive and deductive
inference, respectively (see also Pollard, 1982). However,
theories favoring a rationalist interpretation of inferential
behavior still hold a dominant position in the recent
literature (see, for example, the collections of papers
edited by Falmagne, 1975, and Revlin & Mayer, 1978).
In the case of deductive reasoning, much of the argu-
ment centers on the use by subjects of a system of
logic, whether of the philosopher's variety (cf. Henle,
1962) or of an alternative "natural" type (e.g., Braine,
1978).
The nonlogical or antirational position is sometimes
misinterpreted as denigrating man's proven intelligence.
What is in fact suggested is an alternative conception of
that intelligence. The "rationalist" position entails the
supposition that the reasoner proceeds by forming an
abstract representation of problem information and
applying a general set of inferential rules to its logical
structure, regardless of its content. This notion is clearly
embodied, for example, in Piaget's theory of formal
operations (cf. Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). The alternative
argument stressed here is that specific features of prob-
lem content, and their semantic associations, constitute
the dominant influence on thought (see Evans, 1982,
for extended discussion).
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In this paper, we will focus on the alleged "belief-
bias" effect in reasoning. The claim is that when pre-
sented with deductive arguments to evaluate, subjects
will make judgments upon a priori beliefs rather than on
the basis of logical argument. Specifically, they will
tend to endorse arguments whose conclusions they
believe and reject arguments whose conclusions they
disbelieve, irrespective of their actual validity. A number
of authors have claimed evidence of such an effect in
syllogistic reasoning (e.g., Feather, 1964; Gorden, 1953;
Henle & Michael, 1956; Janis & Frick, 1943; Janis &
Terwilliger, 1962; Kaufman & Goldstein, 1967; Lefford,
1946; Morgan & Morton, 1944; Wilkins, 1928; Wilson,
1965; Winthrop, 1946).
Most of these studies are, however, open to criticism
on a variety of grounds (cf. Evans, 1982). Some find
only weak effects, not backed by tests of statistical sig-
nificance; others use poorly worded problems, fail to
control for other factors that influence reasoning, or risk
carryover effects by having subjects rate the believability
and validity of arguments in the same session. Revlin
and Leirer (1978) and Revlin, Leirer, Yopp, and Yopp
(1980) have raised other problems, such as a failure to
control for the pragmatic convertibility of the logical
premises, that may affect the logical status of the
problem representation. Revlin et al. argue that a rational
reasoner, as proposed by the model of Revlin (1975a,
1975b), should not manifest belief biases, and they
rightly contend that the aging literature on the subject
should be opened up to investigation with improved
methodologies. While finding some evidence of belief-
bias effects, Revlin et al. argue that these are relatively
weak in comparison with the logical tendencies observed,
when due allowance is made for personalized represen-
tations of the premises. The present study questions the
accuracy of this conclusion.
First, we must briefly review the claims of the Revlin
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(1975a, 1975b) model, more specifically known as the
conversion model of syllogistic reasoning. A classical
syllogism consists of two premises and a conclusion
relating three categories. Valid syllogisms are those
whose premises logically determine their conclusions.
The structure of syllogisms is described in detail below.
Revlin's (197Sa, 1975b) model directs our attention
to the personal encodings of the premises of the syllo-
gism. It is proposed that when the premises contain
information about categories that are already available
to the reasoner, long-term memory may provide working
memory with more information than may have been
contained or intended in the presented material. Hence,
the reasoner makes his or her judgments based upon
"too much" information, and not only on the specific
content of the problem. Revlin suggests that this is
manifested in terms of the kinds of immediate inferences
that the reasoners are willing to make when presented
with a proposition. For example, it is claimed that when
shown the abstract relations "All A are B," reasoners
often infer that "All B are A." However, due to prag-
matic implications, conversion may be blocked in some
concrete relations (e.g., "All dogs are animals"). It is
this kind of use of personal knowledge that the conver-
sion model claims will affect the validity judgments on
categorical syllogisms. It is proposed that subjects will
be correct in their judgments in either of two conditions:
(1) when the premises of the problem are converted, but
the logical conclusion is fortuitously the same in the
converted and the original forms of the problem, and
(2) when the subject's knowledge of the world blocks
illicit conversion.
Revlin et al. (1980; see also Revlin & Leirer, 1978)
report evidence to support these hypotheses. As men-
tioned earlier, they also fmd significant, although they
claim "weak," evidence of belief bias when conver-
sion of the premises is fully controlled. However, there
are several methodological problems identified by
Pollard (1979) that may have led Revlin et al. to under-
estimate the extent of the belief-bias effect. For example,
Revlin and Leirer (1978) claim that belief and logic
conflict in the following problem: "No U.S. governors
are members of the Harem Club. Some Arabian sheiks
are members of the Harem Club. Therefore: (a) All
Arabian sheiks are U.S. governors. (b) No Arabian sheiks
are U.S. governors. (c) Some Arabian sheiks are U.S.
governors. (d) Some Arabian sheiks are not U.S. gov-
ernors. (e) None of the above is proved."
The "believable" answer is claimed to be Answer b,
but Answer d is also empirically true. Since Answer d
is the logically correct answer as well, Revlin and Leirer's
(1978) claim that subjects are overriding personal beliefs
in choosing it is doubtful. This problem arises as a result
of the multiple-choice technique, and it can be avoided
by presenting only one conclusion for evaluation, as in
the experiments to be reported here.
A second problem is that the Revlin (1975a, 1975b)
studies employed primarily valid syllogisms. There is
evidence to suggest that belief-bias effects may be more
marked on indeterminate syllogisms, that is, on those
whose conclusions do not follow logically (Kaufman &
Goldstein, 1967).
A third problem is that Revlin and Leirer (1978)
did not control for the effects of "atmosphere," an
alleged bias to choose syllogistic conclusions that share
syntactic features with the premises, regardless of logical
validity. Although existence of this effect, proposed by
Woodworth and Sells (1935), is regarded primarily as an
artifact of conversion by Revlin (197Sa, 1975b), there is
much evidence compatible with the hypothesis (see
Evans, 1982). Since Gorden (1953) has specifically
suggested that belief bias is weaker than atmosphere, it
is advisable to control for its possible effects. In fact,
the logically correct answer to Revlin et al.'s (1980)
valid syllogisms was also the conclusion favored by
atmosphere, which may have led Revlin et al. to over-
estimate subjects' logical abilities.
Experiment 1 was designed to test the relative weight-
ing given to logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning,
controlling for conversion of premises as Revlin (197Sa,
1975b) requires, but also improving upon his method-
ology in the three respects outlined above. In addition,
subjects were asked to provide retrospective verbal
justifications of their decisions. On a different reasoning
task, Wason and Evans (1975) claimed that such reports
indicated no evidence of insight into the origin of
responses apparently induced by a nonlogical bias and
produced logical sounding post hoc rationalizations.
Further investigation of this phenomenon is of interest
with respect to the recent debate about the interpreta-
tion of verbal protocols (see, for example, Ericsson &
Simon, 1980; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
EXPERIMENT 1
The type of problems used in Experiment 1 was
categorical syllogisms. A syllogism is a deductive argu-
ment consisting of two premises and a conclusion. The
two premises make statements about the relations
between three terms: a major term (P), a minor term
(S), and a middle term (M).
The figure of a syllogism indicates the position of the
middle term in the premises. There are four possible
figures, shown in Figures 1-4.
Syllogisms are composed of a combination of four
basic types of statement: (1) The universal affirmative
statement: All X are Y (symbolized by "A"). (2) The
particular affirmative statement: Some X are Y (sym-
bolized by "I"). (3) The universal negative statement:
No X are Y (symbolized by "E"). (4) The particular
negative statement: Some X are not Y (symbolized by
"0"). The types of statement that occur in any particu-
lar syllogism specify its mood.
The form of a syllogism may be completely described,
therefore, by stating its mood and figure. Thus a (valid)
EIO-2 syllogism is of the following form: "No A are B.
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Materials. Half of the syllogisms presented were valid, and
half were invalid (i.e., their conclusions did not follow logically
from the premises). The following two syllogisms were used
throughout: "No A are B. Some Care B. Therefore, some Care
not A" (valid). "No A are B. Some Care B. Therefore, some A
are not C" (invalid).
Note that invalid conclusions were thus of the form C-A and
invalid, A-C'. Both syllogisms are in Figure 2, but the latter
reverses the traditional premise order, so that the mood remains
the same for both valid and invalid syllogisms.
The materials were chosen so that the conclusions of the
syllogisms would appear "true" when the terms were presented
in one order. but "false" when the order of terms was reversed.
The experimenters' intuitions were checked by having a group of
32 subjects, who did not participate in the experiment, rate the
conclusions for believability (see Table I). It will be seen that
the differences in ratings between "true" and "false" sentences
are very marked.
Half of the valid conclusions presented to subjects were
believable, and half were unbelievable. For example, the fallow-
ing syllogism, which is valid, has a believable conclusion: "No
cigarettes are inexpensive. Some addictive things are inexpensive.
Therefore, some addictive things are not cigarettes." This valid
syllogism, on the other hand, has an unbelievable conclusion:
"No addictive things are inexpensive. Some cigarettes are inex-
pensive. Therefore, some cigarettes are not addictive."
For invalid syllogisms, as for valid, half were believable, and
half were not: "No addictive things are inexpensive. Some cig-














Believability Ratings of Conclusions Used in the
Three Experiments
Materials Mean SD
Note-All items were rated on a 7·point scale from 1 = com-
pletely unbelievable to 7 z: completely believable. MaterialsA
were rated by two groups of 16 subjects and MaterialsB by two
separate groups of 16 subjects. Each subject rated four state-
ments. one from each context, of which two were "true" and
two "false."
Figure 4.
Some Care B. Therefore, some C are not A." This was
one of the types of syllogism used in Experiment 1.
Both E and I statements are "legally" convertible,
which means that the terms of the statement may be
reversed without altering its meaning in logic. Since the
two premises of the syllogisms used in this experiment
are of this type, even if subjects do in fact convert
premises, as Revlin and his associates suggest, this could
not in itself be the cause of logical errors. The conver-
sion model, therefore, predicts that reasoning on this
task will be logical, regardless of the type of material
used, and there should be no belief bias.
In the Introduction, a reference was made to atmo-
sphere bias. This is a nonlogical bias first investigated by
Woodworth and Sells (1935; see also Begg & Denny,
1969). Briefly, this effect is due to the type of quanti-
fiers used in the two premises, which combine to create
an "atmosphere," which predisposes subjects to accept
a conclusion containing specific quantifiers. Since the
A (Experiments I, 2, and 3)
T Some highly trained dogs are not police dogs
F Some police dogs are not highly trained
T Some nutritional things are not vitamin tablets
F Some vitamin tablets are not nutritional things
T Some addictive things are not cigarettes
F Some cigarettes are not addictive things
T Some rich people are not millionaires
F Some millionaires are not rich people
B (Experiment 3)
T Some religious people are not priests
F Some priests arc not religious people
T Some healthy people are not astronauts
F Some astronauts are not healthy people
T Some good swimmers are not deep sea divers
F Some deep sea divers are not good swimmers
T Some well educated people are not judges


























Percentage Frequency of Subjects Accepting
Conclusions in Experiment I (n = 24)
with the fmdings of Kaufman and Goldstein (1967)
that belief bias is more marked for invalid than for valid
syllogisms.
These results cannot be reconciled with the essentially
rationalist approach of Revlin and Leirer (1978) and
Revlin et a1. (1980). Their claim that previous evidence
of belief bias could be an artifact of uncontrolled
premise conversion cannot be applied to the present
experiment, in which only E and I premises were
involved. Their further suggestion, on the basis of their
own data, that belief biases are weak in comparison with
rational processes is also inconsistent with our results.
The suggestion in the introduction that their method-
ology led to an underestimate of the true extent of
belief bias is strongly confirmed in our data. They found
subjects to be correct when logic accorded with belief
on 83% of occasions, and when logic conflicted with
belief, on more than 67% of occasions. The correspond-
ing percentages in Experiment 1 were 92% and 27%.
The present results do accord well with the Evans
(1982) two-factor theory, which claims that reasoning
responses reflect a competition between logical and
nonlogical tendencies. This theory has previously been
applied mostly to conditional reasoning problems
(e.g., Evans, 1977a, 1977b). Related to this is the dual
process theory of Wason and Evans (1975), who claim
that the verbalizations observed on their reasoning
problems reflect primarily a type of thought different
from that determining the reasoning response. Specifi-
cally, they found that subjects tended to rationalize
responses attributed to nonlogical biases. Similar trends
should be found in the protocols collected in Experi-
ment 1.
However, Ericsson and Simon (1980) have argued
persuasively that protocols may reveal the locus of the
subjects' attention, or the information heeded by the
problem solver. It could be that the Wason and Evans'
(1975) rationalizations were due to their asking the sub-
jects to justify the responses given. The important issue
in the present study is that of whether subjects base
their reasoning on the logical premises or on extraneous
beliefs. The protocols were consequently scored sepa-
rately for the presence or absence of references to both,
and the results are shown in Table 3.
Of particular interest are the two conditions in which
logic and belief conflict. If subjects are rationalizing,
then we might expect that their protocol ratings would
interact with their response to the problem. That is,
subjects who give the logical response should make more
references to the premises and those favoring belief
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not cigarettes" (invalid, believable conclusion). "No cigarettes
are inexpensive. Some addictive things are inexpensive. There-
fore, some cigarettes are not addictive" (invalid, unbelievable
conclusion).
There were thus four types of problem: valid conclusion,
believable or unbelievable, and invalid conclusion, believable
or unbelievable. Of course, the four problems actually given to
each subject used different problem contents.
To reduce the artificiality of the task, problems were pre-
sented in the form of prose passages that were approximately
80 words in length. Four different types of passage content were
used, each taking the form of a current affairs article. The four
topics were: (1) public response to the behavior of police dogs,
(2) the provision of aid for third-world countries, (3) attempts to
reduce the number of people smoking cigarettes, and (4) the
relationship between wealth and hard work. The following is an
example of Passage Type I: "Dogs are used extensively for the
purpose of guarding property, guiding the blind and so on. No
highly trained dogs are vicious. However, many people believe
that their temperament cannot be trusted. The police service use
dogs a great deal in their work. Some police dogs are vicious
and although fatal accidents are rare, there is still growing con-
cern over their widespread use." "If the above passage is true,
does it follow that: Some highly trained dogs are not police
dogs?" (This conclusion is invalid, but believable.)
Design. Each subject received each of the four types of
prose passages and problem types, solving four problems in all.
Combination of problem type and passage type was balanced in
a Latin square design, and presentation order was randomized.
Subjects. Twenty-four undergraduates at Plymouth Poly-
technic acted as paid volunteers. They had no previous experi-
ence of syllogistic reasoning tasks and were tested individually.
Procedure. Task and instructions. The instructions and
problems for each subject were presented on typed cards. All
problems were presented individually, and each problem card
remained in front of subjects for reference when decisions were
explained. The instructions began as follows:
"This is an experiment to test people's reasoning ability.
You will be given four problems. In each case, you will be given
a prose passage to read and asked if a certain conclusion may be
logically deduced from it. You should answer this question
on the assumption that all the information given in the passage
is, in fact, true. If you judge that the conclusion necessarily
follows from the statements in the passage, you should answer
'yes,' otherwise 'no.'
"Please take your time and be sure that you have the right
answer before stating it. When you have decided, I will then ask
you to explain why you believe the conclusion to be valid or
invalid as the case may be. Any questions?"
Subjects' protocols were recorded on a tape recorder for later
analysis.
Protocol scoring. Each protocol was scored on a yes/no
basis on two criteria: (I) presence or absence of a reference to
both the logically relevant premises, and (2) presence or absence
of references to irrelevant information, either within the passage
or extraneous.
Results and Discussion
The percentage frequencies of subjects accepting the
conclusion (i.e., deeming the argument to be valid) are
shown for each type of problem in Table 2. As pre-
dicted, there was a substantial effect of "belief bias"
(i.e., a tendency over all problems to accept more
believable than unbelievable conclusions; p < .01, one-
tailed sign test). There was also a tendency to accept
more valid than invalid arguments overall (p < .02,
one-tailed) and a significant Belief by Validity interac-
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EXPERIMENT 2
Note-Correct responses italicized. M =mentioned, NM =not
mentioned.
Table 3
Classification Frequencies for Protocols of Experiment I on the
Two Criteria, Broken Down by Response Given (n =24)
Valid-Believable
M 9 1 9
NM 13 I 13
Valid-Unbelievable
M 6 2 2 8
NM 5 11 9 5
Invalid-Believable
M 6 1 14 1
NM 16 1 8 1
Invalid-Unbelievable
M 2 13
NM 20 9 MethodMaterials. The syllogisms and prose passages used were the
same as those of Experiment 1, except for the modification that
permitted both valid and invalid syllogisms to have both A-C
and C-A conclusions. This was produced by interchanging the
quantifiers of each of the original problem premises and revers-
ing their conclusion, for example: "No A are B. Some Care B.
Therefore, some C are not A" (original valid syllogism). "Some
A are B. No Care B. Therefore, some A are not C" (valid control
syllogism).
Design. As in Experiment 1, all subjects received four prob-
lems consisting of all four problem types combined with all four
passage contents. In this experiment, four subject groups were
used: Group 1 received prose passages and was required to ver-
balize the explanation for the decision retrospectively (as in
Experiment 1). Group 2 was required to verbalize in the same
manner as Group 1, but subjects received only the logical prem-
ises and not the full prose passage. Group 3 received prose pas-
sages and was required to verbalize concurrently (i.e., to think
aloud while attempting to solve the problem). Group 4 received
prose passages but was not required to verbalize at all.
Each of these four groups was then subdivided into two
further groups, one of which received only A-C conclusions for
both valid and invalid problems, and the other of which received
C-A conclusions only.
Subjects. Sixty-four undergraduates at Plymouth Polytechnic
acted as paid volunteers. They had no previous experience of
this task and were tested ind ividually.
Procedure. The instructions and problems were presented in
the same manner as Experiment 1.
The instructions were as follows: Group I-instructions as for
Experiment 1. Group 2-instructions as for Experiment 1,
except that any reference to the prose passage was omitted.
Group 3-instructions as for first paragraph of Experiment 1,
continued as follows. "Whilst you are trying to solve each
problem I would like you to try to 'think aloud' as much as you
can. Please don't let this distract you from the task in hand,
which is to obtain the correct solution to the problem. If at any
time during the task, I do not think that you are speaking
enough, I will simply prompt you to speak a little more. Please
take your time and be sure that you have the right answer before
stating it. Any questions?" Group 4-instructions as for Experi-
ment 1, except that any request to verbalize was omitted.
As in Experiment 1, subjects' protocols were recorded on a
tape recorder for later analysis. Protocols were scored using the
same procedure as in Experiment 1.
tion heeded than is the retrospective method used in
Experiment 1.
Finally, the problem structures were modified to take
account of the "figural bias" discussed by Johnson-
Laird and Steedman (1978). They show that the order in
which terms are arranged in the syllogisms can exert an
influence on the choice of conclusion, irrespective of
logical validity. In Experiment 1, all premise pairs were
of the form A-B, CoB, but valid conclusions were always
of the form C-A and invalid conclusions of the form
A-C. According to Johnson-Laird and Steedman's find-
ings (but not their model), there may be a bias to prefer
C-A conclusions with these premise types. This may have
led us to overestimate subjects' logical ability in Experi-
ment 1. In Experiment 2, both valid and invalid prob-
lems were associated with both A-C and C-Aconclusions.
Results and Discussion






should make more references to irrelevant informa-
tion. The same prediction would also be made if the
protocols were assumed to reflect the actual informa-
tion on which the subjects' reasoning was based (an
attempt will be made to distinguish these possibilities
in the general discussion). Only the valid-unbelievable
condition produced a sufficiently even split of "yes" and
"no" responses to permit test of this hypothesis. The
predicted interaction was present and significant for ref-
erences to irrelevant information (p =.026, one-tailed
Fisher exact probability test), but not for references
to the logical premises. It is also relevant to note that in
the invalid-believable condition, subjects who accepted
the conclusion (in accordance with beliefs) showed the
highest ratio of references to irrelevant information and
the lowest ratio of references to the logical premises
observed in the whole experiment.
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate and extend
Experiment 1. There are several difficulties of interpre-
tation of Experiment 1 that Experiment 2 was intended
to resolve. First, the belief bias observed could be due
to the embedding of the logical premises in a prose
passage. This could decrease the subjects' attention to
the logically critical premises. Hence, a group was
included that was given the premises only. Second, it is
possible that the instruction to give verbal justifications,
especially with a within-subjects design, could affect
responses. Hence, another group was added with no
instructions to verbalize. Another group was used to
investigate. further the causes of the trends in the proto-
col analysis. This group provided "thinking-aloud"
protocols, which Ericsson and Simon (1980) argue are
more likely to give an accurate picture of the informa-
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arguments as valid in Experiment 2 is shown in Table 4.
As is apparent from Table 4a, the order of terms in the
conclusion had no significant effect on responses, and
further analyses were collapsed over this factor. Binomial
tests on the combined data of the subjects in all groups
(n =64) yielded highly significant evidence of the three
effects found in Experiment 1. That is, more believable
than unbelievable conclusions were accepted (p < .001),
more valid than invalid conclusions were accepted
(p < .001), and the two factors interacted (p < .01).
The interaction reflects the fact that the belief-bias
effect is more marked for invalid than for valid syllo-
gisms. The interpretation of this interaction will be
deferred to the general discussion. Overall, subjects were
correct 87% of the time when logic accorded with belief
and 48% of the time when it did not.
The same trends were manifested in each of the four
groups (see Table 4b). In order to test whether response
patterns were affected by group, a set of four 2 by 4
chi-square tests were carried out to compare yes/no
frequencies across the four groups for each problem
type. None of these analyses yielded a significant result.
Clearly, the belief-bias effect is not due to embedding
the premises in a prose passage, nor is it affected by
instructions to verbalize, even if in a concurrent manner.
The results of the protocol analyses are shown in
Table 5, for the three groups from whom protocols were
collected. Inspection of Table 5 suggests that the distri-
bution of classification frequencies is, in fact, very
similar for all three groups. This was confirmed statisti-
cally by rank ordering the 16 cell frequencies for each
group and assessing the similarity of the rank orderings
by Kendall's coefficient of concordance (cf. Siegel,
1956). There was high and significant concordance for
both mention of the premises (W =.792, p < .001) and
mention of irrelevant information (W= .871, P < .001).
Consequentiy, further analyses were performed on the
combined data of all three groups.
These analyses revealed highly significant interactions
between the answer given to the problem and the
protocol classifications for the valid-unbelievable prob-
lems. Subjects accepting the valid conclusion against its
believability made more references to the logical premises
(X2 =24.61, P < .001) and fewer references to irrelevant
information (X2 = 15.11, P < .001).
The other problem for which interactions were
observed was the invalid-unbelievable type. Only six
subjects went against both logic and belief to accept
such arguments as valid. However, all six referred to
both logical premises, and none referred to irrelevant
information. Fisher exact probability tests revealed a
significant interaction with the majority "no" responders
in each case (p < .005 and p < .05, respectively). The
simplest interpretation of these findings is that these
subjects ignored beliefs and reasoned from the premises,
but they did so with faulty logic.
Table 4
The Frequencies (in Percent) of Subjects Accepting Conclusions in Each Condition of Experiment 2
Problem Type















B U Group B U B U
59 13 1 81 63 63 18
72 13 2 81 63 44 6
66 13 3 87 50 75 13
4 94 67 63 13
Note-T =prose passage, retrospective verbalization; 2 = premises only, retrospective verbalization; 3 = prose passage, concurrent
verbalization; 4 = prose passage, no verbalization. B = believable; U = unbelievable.
Table 5
Classification Frequencies for Protocols of Experiment 2 (n = 16 in Each Group) Broken Down by Response Given
Both Premises Irrelevant Information
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Combined Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Combined
Problem Type Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
M 10 0 6 1 5 1 21 2 3 1 8 0 6 1 17 2Valid-Believable NM 3 3 7 2 9 1 19 6 10 2 5 3 8 1 23 6
M 9 0 10 1 5 0 24 1 1 5 1 4 2 5 4 14Valid-Unbelievab Ie NM 1 6 1 4 3 8 5 18 9 1 10 1 6 3 25 5
M 4 2 6 2 3 0 13 4 6 2 4 2 8 1 18 5Invalid-Believable NM 6 4 4 4 9 4 19 12 4 4 6 4 4 3 14 11
M 3 5 1 9 2 1 6 15 0 6 0 5 0 7 0 18Invalid-Unbelievable NM 0 8 0 6 0 13 0 27 3 7 1 10 2 7 6 24
Note-M = mentioned; NM = not mentioned; Y = yes response; N = no response. Correct responses are italicized.
The interpretation of the protocol data will be taken
up in the general discussion. There is one further prob-
lem concerning the interpretation of the decision fre-
quencies that Experiment 3 was designed to deal with.
EXPERIMENT 3
In both Experiments 1 and 2, subjects accepted
significantly more valid than invalid conclusions. This
suggests that people have some ability to reason and
overcome belief biases, at least for unbelievable con-
clusions. It is, however, possible that this apparent
logicality is an artifact of a response bias different from
that controlled in Experiment 2. In all the syllogisms
used so far, the quantifer "some" always modified the
same term in the premises as in the conclusion for valid
problems (e.g., "No A are B. Some Care B. Therefore,
some C are not A."), but for invalid problems, this was
never the case (e.g., "No A are B. Some Care B. There-
fore, some A are not C.").
It is therefore possible that some form of feature-
matching bias is responsible for the main effect of
validity. This problem can be overcome if syllogisms in
Figure 3 rather than Figure 2 are employed. For exam-
ple, the following is logically equivalent to the former of
the two problems above: "No Bare A. Some Bare C.
Therefore, some C are not A."
Since in all Figure 3 syllogisms the two terms used in
the conclusion (A and C) appear in the predicates of the
premises, the possible response bias described could not
operate. Experiment 3, therefore, compared subjects'
performance on Figure 2 and Figure 3 syllogisms.
Prose passages were employed, and thinking-aloud
protocols were recorded.
Although the instructions presented in Experiments 1
and 2 clearly indicated that subjects' inferences should
be based on logical necessity, this is an unusual require-
ment for subjects to follow. One interpretation of the
belief-bias effect is that subjects "fail to accept the
logical task" (Henle, 1962). In order to counter this
possibility, the instructions of Experiment 3 were
reworded to increase emphasis on the concept of logical
necessity.
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Method
Design. All subjects received eight problems to solve, the
four types used previously in both Figure 2 and 3 syllogisms.
Four further scenarios were constructed to add to the four used
in Experiments I and 2, and each subject received each of the
eight scenarios, randomly matched to the eight types of prob-
lems. The conclusion ratings for these additional problem
contents are shown in Table 1. Presentation order was also ran-
domized. All subjects were instructed to "think aloud" while
solving the problems.
Subjects. Thirty-two l st-year psychology students of
Plymouth Polytechnic participated in partial fulfillment of
course credit requirements. All were tested individually.
Procedure. The relevant section of the modified instructions
follows: "Your task is to decide whether or not a given conclu-
sion follows logically from the information given, and this
information only. You must assume that all the statements
within the passage are true; this is very important. If, and only if,
you judge that the given conclusion logically follows from the
statements given in the passage you should answer 'yes,' other-
wise 'no."
The final sentence of this extract was repeated at the very
end of the instructions. The procedure was otherwise similar
to that of Experiments I and 2, with "thinking-aloud" instruc-
tions. Protocols were tape-recorded and subsequently tran-
scribed and analyzed in a manner similar to that of the previous
experiments.
Results
The frequencies of responses to the problems are
shown in Table 6. It is apparent that there is no differ-
ence in performance between the Figure 2 and Figure 3
problems, thus eliminating the response-bias explanation
of the validity effect. On the combined data, there
were highly significant preferences to accept conclu-
sions that were believable rather than unbelievable
Table 6
The Percentage Frequencies of Subjects Accepting
Conclusions in Experiment 3
Problem Type
Valid Invalid
B U B U
Figure 2 91 53 69 3
Figure3 91 53 66 9
Combined 91 53 67 6
Note-B = believable; U= unbelievable.
Table 7
Qassification Frequencies for Protocols of Experiment 3 (n = 32) Broken Down by the Response Given
Both Premises Irrelevant Information
Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 2 Figure 3
Problem Type Y N Y N Y N Y N
M 5 I 11 0 16 1 17 1Valid-Believable NM 24 2 18 3 13 2 12 2
M 12 7 10 4 8 7 8 9Valid-Unbelievable NM 5 8 7 11 9 8 9 6
M 7 6 3 4 12 5 14 5Invalid-Believable NM IS 4 18 7 10 5 7 6
Invalid-Unbelievable M I 8 1 7 1 20 2 16NM 0 23 2 22 0 11 1 13
Note-M =mentioned;NM = not mentioned; Y = yes response; N =no response. Correct responses areitalicized.
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(p < .001, binomial test) and those that were valid
rather than invalid (p < .001, binomial test). The inter-
action, although in the same direction as observed
previously, fell just short of significance (p =.067,
one-tailed binomial test). Subjects were correct 97%
of the time when belief agreed with logic and 43% of
the time when belief conflicted with logic.
The protocol analyses are summarized in Table 7.
Previous experiments showed an interaction between
the classification frequencies and type of response for
the valid-unbelievable condition. A similar trend was
observed in Experiment 3 on the references to premises
criterion, although it fell short of significance for both
figures. No interaction trend was apparent on the refer-
ence to irrelevant information criterion. No other con-
ditions produced significant interactions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Over the three experiments, consistently large and
significant effects of belief bias have been observed,
despite controls for conversion of premises (cf. Revlin
et al., 1980). Similarly, large and consistent effects of
logical validity have been observed despite the controls
introduced to test response-bias explanations in Experi-
ments 2 and 3. There is also a consistent trend for the
two factors to interact, such that the belief-bias effect
is more marked for invalid than for valid problems.
The strong instructional emphasis on logical necessity in
Experiment 3 renders implausible any suggestion that
the belief-bias effect reflects uncertainty on the sub-
jects' part of what they were required to do. If they are
"failing to accept the logical task," it is because they are
unable to do so.
The Belief by Logic interaction arises because sub-
jects respond differently to the two conditions in which
logic and belief conflict. When the problem is invalid
but believable, subjects generally accept the conclusion.
Response rates are intermediate, however, when the
syllogisms are valid but have unbelievable conclusions.
This condition is especially interesting also with refer-
ence to protocol analysis, since subjects conforming to
logic tend to refer to the premises, whereas those con-
forming to beliefs tend to refer instead to irrelevant
information.
We must now ask what process of reasoning could
account for these findings. There are a number of pub-
lished models of syllogistic reasoning (e.g., Dickstein,
1978a, 1978b; Erickson, 1974; Guyote & Sternberg,
1981; Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978; Revlin, 1975a,
1975b). These models differ considerably in the details
of their psychological descriptions, but in one respect
they all agree. All the models suppose that the subject
starts by forming a representation of the premises and
then generates a conclusion, or set of possible conclu-
sions, by a more or less logical (according to the model)
process of reasoning. The subject then selects from the
available list of conclusions one that matches the one
that he or she has generated (or, in the case of Johnson-
Laird & Steedman, 1978, he or she simply writes down
the conclusion generated).
None of these models can, in its present form, account
for the results of the present study. The main sources of
error permitted by these models are either faulty repre-
sentation of the premises (conversion) or figural bias in
the processing of representations. Our syllogisms were
constructed such that all premises were legally con-
vertible; the figures chosen were those least susceptible
to figural bias and, in any case, were consistent across
conditions. Finally, the results cannot be explained by
atmosphere bias, either (cf. Begg & Denny, 1969;
Woodworth & Sells, 1935), since all conclusions were
equally favored by atmosphere.
Two of the models provide additional scope for the
occurrence of reasoning errors; those of Guyote and
Sternberg (1981) and Johnson-Laird and Steedman
(1978). Only Guyote and Sternberg have made an
attempt to explain the effects of problem content on
reasoning. One of their experiments compared reasoning
with factual (believable) and counterfactual (unbe-
lievable) content, but they do not discuss possible
interactions with validity. They do say that content
affected reasoning and that the subsequent parameter'
estimations for their model suggest that "subjects store
and manipulate factual information with greater ease
than they do other kinds of information (Guyote &
Sternberg, 1981, p. 499). This implies that subjects
should reason more logically with believable than with
unbelievable content. In fact, the interaction observed
in the present experiments was the opposite of this:
Subjects were more sensitive to logical validity on unbe-
lievable problems.
We do not believe that our results can be explained
on the assumption that all reasoning proceeds from the
representation of the premises toward a conclusion. It
appears that subjects not only check the validity of the
conclusion (by reference to the premises) but are also
influenced by a separate, direct assessment of its truth
value. There are several ways in which the Belief by
Validity interaction could arise. First, it may be that
subjects accept uncritically a conclusion with which
they agree but are more likely to check the logic if they
do not agree with the conclusion. This is directly
analogous to the finding of Lord, Lepper, and Ross
(1979) that people will accept at face value the evidence
of research studies whose conclusions agree with their
prior beliefs, but they will criticize the design and
methodology of those with conflict.
There are however, other explanations of the inter-
action. In the valid-unbelievable condition, the conflict
is that logic dictates that the conclusion must be
accepted despite its unbelievability. However, in the
invalid-believable condition, the conflicting role of logic
is less strong. Logically, the invalid conclusions do not
necessarily follow from the premises, but neither are
they contradicted by them. Since the conclusion is not
inconsistent with the premises, subjects may feci justi-
fied in favoring belief. Dickstein (1980, 1981) has pre-
sented evidence that subjects.may indeed have difficulty
in understanding this aspect of the concept of logical
necessity. It is possible that the somewhat weaker
Belief by Logic interaction observed in Experiment 3
was due to the modification of the instructions that
emphasized that "yes" answers should be given if and
only if the conclusions followed logically from the
premises. This second explanation differs from the first
in assuming that subjects always evaluate both the
validity and the believability of each conclusion, but
they respond differently to the two types of conflict.
A third explanation is that the conflict arising from
unbelievable conclusions is less strong than that arising
from believable conclusions, with our particular mater-
ials. Inspection of Table 1 reveals that while "true"
statements are rated very close to the top of the scale,
"false" items are rated, on average, only 1 point lower
than the midpoint of the scale. Thus, in the valid-
unbelievable condition, the bias to reject the conclusion
on the basis of belief may be less strong than is the bias
to accept, in accordance with belief, in the invalid-
believable condition.
Unlike previous studies, we also have verbal protocol
data to consider. The combined data of the three experi-
ments are shown in two different ways in Table 8.
Table 8a shows the probability of giving a particular
explanation as a function of the response made. This is
the appropriate way to look at the data if one assumes
that they are rationalizations. In addition to the inter-
action that has been noted for the valid-unbelievable
condition, a trend in the other conflict emerges on these
pooled data. It seems that there is a tendency to give
more references to irrelevant information when accept-
ing invalid but believable conclusions. This suggests that
subjects do perceive a conflict between logic and belief
in this condition also, although less markedly than for
valid-unbelievable problems.
On the other hand, if one supposes that the protocols
do reflect the basis on which subjects were reasoning,
then it is more appropriate to look at the likelihood of
responses, given the protocol scores (see Table 8b).
An interesting picture emerges here. It seems that the
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Logic by Belief interaction is present for problems in
which subjects refer to the premises or do not make
irrelevant references, but it is absent when the premises
are not cited or when irrelevant information is men-
tioned. The latter problems show almost pure belief
bias, with little effect at all of validity.
This might seem to suggest that there are two kinds
of subjects: some resting their conclusions on the
premises, and others not. However, although there is
generally a negative relation between scores on the two
criteria on any particular subject's response to a given
problem, most subjects score positively on both criteria
somewhere on their problems. It is still of interest to
know whether subjects respond in a consistent manner
to the conflict created by the valid-unbelievable condi-
tion. This can be examined by comparing the subjects'
responses to the Figure 2 and 3 problems of this type in
Experiment 3. It turns out that the response rates on the
two tasks are quite independent: Of the 16 accepting
the Figure 2 conclusion, 9 accepted a Figure 3; of the
16 who did not accept a Figure 2, 8 accepted a Figure 3.
The above analysis supports the idea of a within-
subjects conflict, as opposed to individual differences in
strategies, which accords with Evans' (1977b) discussion
of the Wason selection task. Indeed, the whole pattern
of results is consistent with the theory of reasoning put
forward by Evans (I 982) and previously applied to con-
ditional reasoning problems. That is, response proba-
bilities reflect competing logical and nonlogical pro-
cesses. However, we still have two areas of uncertainty
in the interpretation of the results: (1) Which explana-
tion of the Belief by Logic interaction is correct? and
(2) to what extent do the protocols reflect rationaliza-
tions, and to what extent the actual basis of subjects
reasoning? An additional treatment of the protocols,
shown in Table 9, helps to provide answers to both
these questions.
This analysis was concerned with the order of men-
tion of the premises and conclusion. The analysis was
confmed to "thinking-aloud" protocols only (Experi-
ment 2. Group 3, and Experiment 3 combined), since
it was thought that order of items in retrospective
protocols need not reflect the actual order in which the
subjects did things. There were three main classifica-
Table 8
Percentage of Positive ProtocolScores (Mentions) as a Functionof Response Given and Percentage of Yes
Responses asa Functionof ProtocolScores
------------------"----
(a) Percentage of Positive Protocol Scores (b) Percentage of Yes Responses
BothPremises Irrelevant Information Both Premises Irrelevant Information
Yes No Yes No M NM M NM
---~----_ ..
Valid-Believable 41 31 47 36 91 86 91 86
Valid-Unbelievable 68 19 26 63 79 31 31 68
Invalid-Believable 30 41 60 43 70 77 81 69
Invalid-Unbelievable 72 23 45 54 25 3 5 11
.~--------- ---_.__._---~---_ .._ .. . ~--_.
Note-M = mentioned; NM = not mentioned. Data are combined [or the three experiments; average Figure 2 and Figure 3 responses
were used for Experiment 3 (n = 104).
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Table 9
Analysis of Thinking-Aloud Protocols for Experiment 2, Group 3 (n = 16), and for
Experiment 3, Measured over Figures 2 and 3 (n = 32) Combined
a b
Conclusion Conclusion Premises to Conclusion Conclusion Premises to
Only to Premises Conclusion Other Only to Premises Conclusion
Valid-Believable 39 29 25 7 86* 100* 88*
Valid-Unbelievable 34 28 34 3 70 48 30
Invalid-Believable 46 24 27 3 73 78 54
Invalid-Unbelievable 41 33 17 8 98* 97* 81*
Note-a = percentage frequency of protocol classifications as a function of problem type; b = percentage ofdecisions favoring belief
on each problem as a function of protocol classification. "Logically correct response.
tions: Conclusions only (C)-These protocols refer to the
conclusion but do not mention either premise. They
mayor may not include references to irrelevant informa-
tion. Conclusion to premises (CP)-These protocols
included reference to at least one premise after mention
of the conclusion. Premises to conclusions (PC)-These
protocols included mention of at least one premise fol-
lowed by mention of the conclusion. (In some cases, CP
and PC protocols also included irrelevant information.)
Table 9a shows that the great majority of protocols
were classifiable in one of these three ways and that the
distribution of classifications over the four problem
types was quite similar. Table 9b shows the percentage
of subjects favoring belief (saying ''yes'' on believable
or "no" on unbelievable problems) as a function of
protocol classification. Several features of this table
suggest that the protocol analysis is diagnostic of the
amount of logical reasoning subjects are doing. The PC
protocols are associated with least belief bias in the two
conflict conditions, suggesting that they do reflect more
logical (premise-to-conclusion) reasoning. Note also that
almost all logical errors in the invalid-unbelievable con-
dition are associated with PC protocols. This confirms
the interpretation given in discussion of Experiment 2
that such errors arise from subjects who ignore belief,
reason from the premises, but make a logical error in
doing so.
The C protocols, we suggest, are those of subjects
who focus their attention on the conclusion and thus
give the highest rates of belief bias. Even here, however,
there are two sources of evidence that the premises,
although not mentioned, have some influence on the
subjects. One is the visible fact in Table 9b that their
rate of favoring belief is higher if the response is also
logically correct. The second is the fact that the mention
of irrelevant information by such subjects (as inferred
from Table 8) is greater when the logic contradicts the
belief-biased response. Thus C protocols are primarily
associated with belief-biased, rationalizing subjects.
The CP protocols reflect subjects who focus on the
conclusion but also go on to consider the premises.
They show intermediate rates of belief bias, presumably
because in some cases the premises are seen to contra-
diet the belief, but they still do less well than those
who attempt to reason from premises to conclusion.
This interpretation of Table 9b suggests that there is
no singular answer to the problem posed by Table 8:
The protocols partially reflect the basis of subjects'
reasoning and partially reflect rationalization. We now
ask what Table 9 can contribute to our understanding
of the Belief by Logic interaction. The frequency of PC
protocols is unaffected by the believability of the con-
clusion in Table 9a (26% with believable and 26% with
unbelievable conclusions). This is not surprising if the
PC protocols indicate subjects engaged in premise-to-
conclusion reasoning. However, our first interpretation
of the interaction does predict a shift between C and CP
protocols for subjects who focus initially on the con-
clusion. Specifically, it was suggested that such subjects
are more likely to go on to consider the premises if the
conclusion is unbelievable than if it is believable. Some
shift in this direction is actually observed. There were
43% C protocols for believable problems, dropping to
38% on unbelievables; there were 27% CP protocols on
believables, rising to 31% on unbelievables.
The general picture of Table 9 does not, however,
support this interpretation of the interaction, for two
reasons. First, the observed shift between C and CP
protocols is too small to account for the large interac-
tion in the response frequencies. Second, both CP and
PC protocols are associated with substantially more
belief bias in the invalid-believable condition than in the
valid-unbelievable condition. This must mean that sub-
jects who take account of both logic and belief experi-
ence more competition from belief in the former condi-
tion than in the latter. Thus, either our second or our
third interpretation of the interaction is to be preferred.
Whether it is due to weaker logic on invalid than on valid
problems or to stronger belief on believable than on
unbelievable problems cannot be distinguished in the
present experiments.
Finally, the analysis shown in Table 9 is helpful in
resolving a problem raised by a reviewer of this paper,
namely, that believability of the conclusion is inevitably
confounded with believability of the premises. By the
laws of logic, any valid argument with a false conclusion
must have either a false premise or premises with incom-
patible suppositions. Such premises might strike the
subject as anomalous and thus inhibit reasoning. How-
ever, the data of Table 9 strongly suggest that this is not
the main cause of belief bias on valid-unbelievable
problems. Table 9a shows that most subjects use a
conclusion-centered strategy on these problems, and
Table 9b shows that the majority (70%) of those who
do reason from premises to conclusion correctly accept
the inference.
In conclusion, we hope that we have shown that the
introduction of protocol analysis has proved to be a
most productive way of differentiating and understand-
ing the processes underlying the belief-bias effect. The
picture that finally emerges is that logic and belief
conflict throughout, but they do so at different levels.
When subjects focus primarily on the conclusion, belief
biases are maximal and logical effects are minimal.
Such subjects often rationalize their responses by refer-
ring to irrelevant information. These are the clearest
examples of Henle's (1962) "failure to accept the logical
task," but they still show a small influence of logic. On
about 25% of occasions, though, a genuine premise-to-
conclusion inference is attempted, with much higher
logical success. It is most important to note, however,
that even in cases in which the logical task is accepted,
substantial (although lesser) effects of belief bias are
still observed. These fmdings not only provide a chal-
lenge for existing models of syllogistic reasoning but also
raise broader questions about people's rational compe-
tence to generate and assess logical arguments in real
life, whenever they have clear a priori beliefs about the
subject under discussion.
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